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Coordination of European Research on Industrial Safety towards Smart and Sustainable Growth

Integrated Management of Safety and Security Synergies in Seveso Plants

  • This project originates from the following problems highlighted in SAF€RA's 2018 call: the security threats deriving from terrorism, internal malevolence, leading more industry sectors to grapple with the challenge of managing security and safety concerns in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, digitalization creates new safety and security challenges, such as the TRITON virus, which recently attacked industrial Safety Instrumented Systems. Indeed, the security of industrial sites, and in particular the security of the chemical and process industry (Seveso plants), has become a matter of increasing concern in recent years. Besides, the convergence of safety and security issues is a potential cause for major accidents.        The objective of the study is to find solutions to the challenge of managing safety and security concerns in a coordinated manner, as well as to examine how impacts of digitalisation for safety and security of the plants are understood and identified.

  • The following three Research hypotheses are defined:

    • Despite tensions, significant synergies between safety and security management exist;

    • Security-related scenarios concerning intentional acts are not adequately considered in documentation following up the Seveso Directive;

    • Many companies in European process industry lack adequate control measures as regards cyber security and cyber-attacks.

    Research questions are as follows:

    • What are the differences and similarities in safety and security management and cultures in Seveso plants? How can safety and security management be linked?

    • How could threats caused by intentional cyber-physical interferences be better taken into account in Seveso plants?

    • How are cyber threats caused by digitalisation identified and taken into account when assessing and ensuring safety of a process plant? How is cyber-situational awareness of Seveso plants in European countries?

    • How could safety and security threats concerning major hazards be handled in an integrated manner? What are the benefits and drawbacks?

  • The expected results of this multidisciplinary research are an improved integrated safety and security management framework and guidelines for the Seveso plants, better insight into attitudes and preparedness of European process industries as regards cyber-physical security threats, guidelines and a set of specific tools for the identification of accident scenarios with intentional causes. 

    The results will serve the needs of improving safety and security in 12.000 Seveso III industrial establishments in the European Union (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/).  Moreover, regulators, senior managers, safety/ security experts, shop-floor workers in companies, and policy makers benefits from the results, which will be disseminated via seminars, blogs and events by SAFERA platform.

  • WP 1 Integrated management of safety and security (VTT). The main objectives of WP1 are as follows:

    • Examine the existing relevant studies on integrated safety and security management

    • Identify the main differences and similarities in safety and security requirements, management and cultures

    • Develop a framework for management of safety and security of Seveso sites in an integrated and coordinated manner.

    Scope. The study of integrated management of safety and security is conducted via document analysis and case studies. These activities include:

    • Collecting and reviewing studies on integrated safety and security management

    • Reviewing and synthetizing the documents on requirements for and management of safety and security

    • Case studies including interviews carried out in Finland, Italy and Netherlands

    • Benchmarking, and developing an integrated framework for safety and security management

    WP 2 Attitudes and awareness of cyber-physical security threats in organizations (UCBM).  The main objectives of WP2 are as follows:

    • Provide an overview of attitudes and awareness of employees in European industries (with a specific focus on Seveso plants) regarding vulnerabilities concerning their physical safety as a result of cyber physical security threats.

    • Supplement the qualitative results from WP1 with quantitative data to provide input for WP3

    Scope. The study is conducted primarily through a survey based on existing knowledge within the consortium supplemented with an exploration of the literature and information gathered in WP1, with the aim to:

    • Collect information on attitudes and awareness of European industries as regards to vulnerabilities and threats concerning cyber physical security in relation to workplace safety.

    • Investigate the most common technical and organizational measures adopted to manage these vulnerabilities and threats;

    • Statistically analyse the collected data to emphasize common and critical aspects within and between European organisations.

    The survey will primarily focus on Finnish, Italian and Dutch organisations.

    WP 3 Security-related scenarios concerning intentional interferences (UniBO).
    The main objectives of the WP are as follows:

    • Derive lessons learnt from physical and cyber-physical security-related events reported for industrial facilities

    • Identify major accident scenarios related to physical and cyber-physical threats in Seveso sites

    • Develop a guideline for the framework for management of safety and security of Seveso sites in an integrated and coordinated manner.

    Scope. The study of security-related scenarios in Seveso sites is carried out both by document analysis and by the use of specific methodologies for hazard identification, in part to be developed within the project. These activities include:

    • Analyzing security-related past events reported in open databases or in the literature

    • Assessing the awareness with respect to the potential hazard posed by physical and cyber-physical intrusions in Seveso plant

    • Applying specific technical methods and tools to the identification of physical and cyber-physical security-related major accident scenarios

  • Presentation at SAF€RA's 2022 symposium

    Publication date:

    23/08/22

    License:

    Creative Commons Attribution

    Type:

    Presentation

    Integrated Management of Safety and Security Synergies in Seveso plants (SAF€RA 4STER): Final Report

    Publication date:

    26/04/21

    License:

    Type:

    Final report

    This is the final report summarises the main results of the research  project on Integrated Management of Safety and Security Synergies in  Seveso plants (SAF€RA 4STER). The objectives of the research project  were the following: 1) To gain insights into synergies and tensions  related to the management of safety and security in Seveso plants. 2) To  find a solution to the challenge of managing safety and security in a  coordinated manner. 3) To provide guidelines for managing safety and  security in an integrated way in Seveso plants. 4) To provide tools for  the identification of security scenarios triggered by malicious human  intentions.  The research data included literature reviews on concepts and management  of safety, security, cybersecurity; interviews with regulators and  safety and security experts on Seveso sites; analysis of past accidents  induced by malicious human intent both in the form of physical security  violence and cybersecurity interference, and survey on cybersecurity  awareness and physical security awareness in companies.  Past incident analysis showed that terrorism and cyberattacks were the  most important threat categories for Seveso plants. Even though, past  incident analysis showed that no major events occurred in chemical or  petrochemical facilities due to cyber-attacks, they remain a relevant  threat category, and worth paying attention to. This is because of the  current trend towards growing digitalisation, automation and blurring  boundaries between IT and operational technology (OT) systems in  high-risk industries, makes OT systems vulnerable to cybersecurity  attacks.  Cybersecurity awareness in Seveso plants was reported to be at a good  level. However, survey respondents had seen ignorance and negligence in  their companies regarding cybersecurity. It is possible to create  technological barriers, e.g., firewalls, anti-virus software, and to  design IT systems so that they direct people to act securely without the  need for people to make their own choices. Furthermore, human and  organizational barriers, such as integrated management and safety and  security culture, are needed. Institutional support to integrated  management is weak. The Seveso directive does not require integration.  Often cybersecurity is dealt with by IT department, and processsafety  and cybersecurity risks are handled separately. These do not contribute  to integration. The Responsible Care programme and Environment, Health  and Safety and Security (EHS&S) management system adopted by many  Seveso plants, do combine different standards into the same management  system and thus they represent structural integration. However, they are  not sufficient to tackle systemic risks, deriving from  interconnectedness of technological and organisational systems and  related risks. Integrated management would benefit from risk  assessments, in which process-safety risks, physical security risks and  cybersecurity risks and their significance would be examined together,  e.g. in the same Hazop study. The integrated management would require  deep understanding of systemic risks, and new safety and security  thinking, and close collaboration between different safety and security  experts. Both single plants and industrial parks would benefit from  Integrated management.

    Guidelines: Integrated Management of Safety and Security Synergies in Seveso plants (SAF€RA 4STER)

    Publication date:

    26/04/21

    License:

    Type:

    Guidelines report

    The digitalisation trend in the process-industries bring with new safety  and security challenges. Modern plants are constantly investing in  automation, allowing plant to operate autonomously, to different  degrees. For a long time, chemical plants were not connected to  networks, and thus they were not designed with cybersecurity in mind.  However, now the connections to information networks outside the plant  are more and more common. As a result, cyberattacks launched against the  safetycritical chemical industries can cause severe safety threats, in  the worst case, trigger an explosion. The probability that computer  networks and information systems belonging to such sectors is attacked -  and successfully so - is now higher than ever.  This document provides guidance on what to consider when designing and  implementing integrated safety and security management in Seveso plants.  The guidance cover different aspects of management including a)  recognition of the context of organisation, b) leadership, c) planning,  d) support, e) operation, f) performance evaluation and g) improvement. Integrated management refers to connecting, coordinating and combining  safety and security management activities in order to exploit synergies  and to resolve conflicts between them. Understanding and recognising  their similarities and differences, and their intertwined nature is  essential for carrying out integration. Integration may be implemented  in structures and functions, and it promotes the creation of a new  integrated culture, which also needs to be managed.  The integration of activities requires motivation. The need is based on  increasing cybersecurity threats concerning the plants involving major  chemical hazards. The benefits of integration include convenience,  improved safety and security performance, resource optimisation, and  increased resilience.  The potential activities, in which safety and security management could  be combined include, for example, risk assessment, incident reporting,  emergency management, change management and informing the public.  Safety and security are intertwined domains, comprising both common and  different aspects. Both specific safety and security knowledge and  integrated management are needed. Simply combining and communicating  between safety and security domains is not sufficient due to the  intertwined and complex nature of present safety and security issues. A  new integrative mind-set is required in the future.

  • Ingrid Raben

    TNO

    The Netherlands

    Anne Jansen

    TNO

    The Netherlands

    Steijn Wouter

    TNO

    The Netherlands

    Dolf Van der Beek

    TNO

    The Netherlands

    Gabriele Oliva

    Complex systems and security lab, University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome

    Italy

    Roberto Setola

    Complex systems and security lab, University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome

    Italy

    Alessandro Tugnoli

    Università di Bologna

    Italy

    Ernesto Salzano

    Università di Bologna

    Italy

    Minna Nissilä

    VTT, Technical Research Center of Finland

    Finland

    Jouko Heikkilä

    VTT, Technical Research Center of Finland

    Finland

    Nadezhda Gotcheva

    VTT, Technical Research Center of Finland

    Finland

    Marja Ylönen

    VTT, Technical Research Center of Finland

    Finland

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